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McLean, H. Gilmore, M.A., Spring 2018    Environmental Philosophy 
Experiences of Wildness and Value 
Chairperson: Christopher Preston 
Philosophers have often failed to think of concepts in terms of how they are actually 
experienced. Specifically, two concepts in environmental philosophy, intrinsic value and 
wildness, are rarely considered in terms of our experience. Rather, they are often 
understood as qualities of a natural place, and not qualities of our experience. This thesis 
first advocates the importance of understanding intrinsic value and wildness as 
experienced. I then argue for a radical openness in life that can help us experience both 
intrinsic value and wildness often, and in places we didn’t expect them before. Our 
inability to experience these things is not indicative of their lack, it is indicative of ours. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is about the centrality of human experience and how philosophers have often failed to 
think of concepts in terms of how they are actually experienced. Specifically, two concepts in 
environmental philosophy, intrinsic value and wildness, are rarely considered in terms of our 
experience. Rather, they are often understood as qualities of a natural place, and not qualities of 
our experience. This thesis first advocates the importance of understanding intrinsic value and 
wildness as experienced. I then argue for a radical openness in life that can help us experience 
both intrinsic value and wildness often, and in places we didn’t expect them before. Our inability 
to experience these things is not indicative of their lack, it is indicative of ours. 
 In chapter one of this paper I write about the importance of intrinsic value to philosophy. 
Intrinsic value, or the notion that something has value in and of its own right, has been central to 
environmental philosophy since its inception. Unresolved questions about whether, when, and 
how the natural environment has intrinsic value and what that means for us have obsessed many 
well-meaning, nature-loving philosophers. 
 Recently, several philosophers have claimed that arguments about intrinsic value have 
acted more as a hindrance to actually preventing environmental degradation than as a helpful 
philosophical underpinning, and that these discussions have stopped being useful (McShane, 910 
- 911). One result of this is the argument that the protection of nature should be based wholly on 
instrumental, anthropocentric values. 
 I argue that an experience of intrinsic value, as redefined by Katie McShane, is a 
necessary part of environmental philosophy and ethics in general. McShane argues that among 
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the many understandings of intrinsic value, the most useful to philosophy is one that takes 
intrinsic value to mean a simple claim about how we should care about things. She argues that 
we should keep intrinsic value in philosophy because intrinsically valuing is something we 
already and always will do. McShane argues that we experience intrinsic value through emotions 
and valuing attitudes. This transforms our understanding of intrinsic value from some abstract 
metaphysical quality in the world to something that we can actually experience. 
 In chapter two, I argue that wildness, too, is something that we experience. Our inability 
to experience wildness does not indicate its lack. Rather we have preconceived notions about 
where it is appropriate to find wildness. This brings to light well-established dualisms between 
culture and nature as well as self and non-self. I argue that though these boundaries are 
occasionally practical and necessary, they are overstated and harmful to our understanding of 
wildness. 
 Because of these dualisms, philosophers of wildness often champion experiences of 
wildness in some places but miss the wildness in other places. Because they defend wildness 
mostly as a quality of wilderness and natural areas, they restrict our experiences of wildness to 
those places. Wildness, I claim, is an always present, consistent, underlying possibility and the 
experience of wildness depends on the observer’s ability to perceive it. I will introduce the 
philosophy of Gary Snyder, as it focuses on actively disassembling the dualisms that keep us 
separate from an experience of wildness. 
 In chapter three, I will discuss the implications of intrinsic value and wildness as 
experienced and how these experiences can inform our practice. While experiences of intrinsic 
value and wildness are considered experiences that demand our attention, this chapter is about 
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what it would mean to give this attention freely. It is about paying attention to how we already 
experience the world. 
 I bring in Tom Birch’s practice of universal consideration, which proposes that a basic 
consideration and attention should be given to everything. I argue that Birch’s universal 
consideration shares much with the practice of Zen Buddhism, which he implicitly and explicitly 
refers to. I view Zen through the lens of Snyder, who is not only a firm believer in wildness, but 
has been tremendously influenced by Zen and sees a connection between the two. 
 Zen is far from the only practice that has the capability to help us pay attention to the 
world and how we move through it. It is but one among many tools at our disposal for teaching 
that attention and cultivating it where it didn’t exist before. To pay this kind of attention to our 
lives is not only to see intrinsic value and wildness, but it’s to understand ourselves better and 
how we experience the world we live in. 
 The intrinsic value and wildness we experience in natural areas and wilderness refreshes 
and invigorates us. Though these places are incredibly important to preserve, we do both 
ourselves and our daily lives a disservice to think such experiences are restricted to those places. 
My ultimate goal in this thesis is to give a conceptual and practical way of living and 
experiencing our own daily, seemingly mundane lives in a fuller way. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Since its inception in the 1970s, environmental philosophy has sought a way to explain that the 
natural world has intrinsic value, or value independent of instrumental, extrinsic value put on it 
by humans. This pursuit has resulted in years of conversation about how best to argue for the 
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existence of it. The inconclusive nature of the conversation has led many environmental 
philosophers to abandon it as a compelling reason to prevent environmental destruction. 
 It is not my goal in this paper to prove the existence of intrinsic value. Whether or not 
intrinsic value really exists, we tend to experience certain things as intrinsically valuable. This 
goes against most intrinsic value theorists, who tend to focus less on our experience of value and 
more on its metaphysical status or the moral implications of it. 
One exception is Katie McShane. In her article “Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn’t 
Give Up on Intrinsic Value,” McShane differentiates four approaches to intrinsic value theory, 
claiming that some are more helpful to philosophy than others: 
1. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about 
the distinctive role that X should play in moral decision making. 
2. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about 
the distinctive way that it makes sense to care about X. 
3. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about 
which properties of X make it valuable. 
4. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about 
the metaphysical status of X’s value properties (McShane, 47). 
 
 
She argues that the second category of intrinsic value offers the most promise specifically for 
environmental ethics and for ethics in general. In explaining this category, she writes that its 
proponents are most interested in differentiating between intrinsic and instrumental values of 
something (McShane, 48). According to McShane, if we experience something as intrinsically 
valuable versus instrumentally valuable we care about it in a different way. 
 McShane explains different valuing attitudes as how we experience the value of, that is 
care about, certain things. What she is arguing is that we do not and cannot experience intrinsic 
value directly as intrinsic value; she writes, “as many of the sentimentalists have pointed out, we 
rarely if ever just plain value things. Rather, we take some particular valuing attitude toward 
them - admiration, awe, respect, and so on” (McShane, 50). We experience it as a mediating 
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valuing attitude like an emotion through which we come to see the value of something.1 This 
view has a couple of connected, immediate consequences.  
 First, by showing that emotions can be experiences of intrinsic value, those emotions are 
made more philosophically legitimate. As McShane puts this, “what we lose, then, in giving up 
the concept of intrinsic value, is the prospect of an ethics that can accept the structure of many of 
our most common valuing attitudes, rather than treating them as mere mistakes” (McShane, 54). 
If we say we are in love with someone, we don’t mean that we love them just when they make us 
dinner or when they’re there to support us, we mean that we love them for who they are. In other 
words, we love them intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally. Intrinsic value, which is 
usually considered something one arrives at through thinking, is also felt. 
 McShane’s understanding of value as experienced can give us insight into a well-
documented conflict in philosophy between feminist care ethics and intrinsic value theory. In 
light of McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value, this split can be reconciled. To care 
ethicists, intrinsic valuation often comes across as a cold, unfeeling calculation that doesn’t 
recognize values and virtues traditionally associated with women. Among others, ecofeminist 
Marti Kheel writes in the introduction to her book Nature Ethics, “I believe that terms like 
‘value’ connote an economic framework by which humans rate the rest of the natural world… I 
do not argue that my friends and family have intrinsic value; nor do I wish to make this argument 
for other-than-humans” (Kheel, 7-8). To its critics in mainstream philosophy, care ethics is 
perceived as not rigorous enough and relying too much on the emotions of the moral agent (Tong 
and Williams). Care ethics allows us to be partial to the things we care about rather than relying 
                                                 
1 Throughout her article, McShane uses the word “attitude” to describe these experiences. I have opted to also use 
the word emotion, as it better captures some of these experiences. Attitude means one’s position, opinion, or way of 
being. Emotion etymologically means to be shaken up. For anyone who has been struck by an emotion like love, or 
as I argue, has experienced wildness, this seems appropriate. 
6 
 
on a universal code of ethics. But it would be absurd to argue that a person ever only relies 
exclusively on ethical theories or their emotions. 
 Holmes Rolston, III, one of the most notable defenders of intrinsic value, explains 
intrinsic value as an inalienable, metaphysical property of something independent of human 
perception (McShane, 49). His philosophy seems to say that it’s not a matter of choice in what 
we care about so much as a matter of duty-driven, deontological fact. However, Rolston 
mentions care several times in his book Environmental Ethics, to the extent that he implies that 
experiences of intrinsic value are why we can care. He writes, “Places that stimulate an 
experience of the sublime warrant particular care, as that experience is infrequent in rebuilt 
environments” (Rolston, 305) and “If natural things have values, we cannot conceivably learn 
this without experiences by which we are let in on them. With every such sharing there comes a 
caring…[emphases added]” (Rolston, 28) These experiences are in fact the same as McShane’s 
valuing attitudes. In this way Rolston corroborates McShane’s point that intrinsic value must be 
experienced and as a result of this experience, we come to care for that person or thing. Though 
Rolston insists we have a duty to something because of its intrinsic value, it is only because of an 
experience of that value that we can care and feel that we have some duty towards something. 
Among those who explicitly comment on the controversy, Christopher Preston argues 
that Rolston’s approach is not incommensurable with a care-based approach. Rolston’s 
philosophy relies not only on a metaphysical understanding of intrinsic value, but also the 
individual’s relationship with something that has such a value (Preston, 253). Preston follows his 
students’ intuitions about this relationship and comments on their dissatisfaction with this 
conflict, “While the students recognise a different emphasis they tend to see the two approaches 
as different sides of the same coin rather than incompatible moral theories. 'You could not value 
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something intrinsically unless you also cared about it' one student complained” (Preston, 244). 
This intuition may not be consistent with strict interpretations of the other types of intrinsic value 
McShane mentions, but it is consistent with hers. 
While, as Kheel fears, some understandings of intrinsic value theory present the 
possibility of rating and ranking the environment and creatures in it in a way that may end up 
being overbearingly anthropocentric, a different understanding can alleviate this fear. What care 
ethics makes explicit is the role of the emotions of the moral agent, where intrinsic value theory 
rarely does. However, if we believe McShane’s claim, and I think we should, that care is deeply 
entwined with what we experience as intrinsically valuable, these theories seem less combative 
and more complementary. 
The second result of McShane’s idea that intrinsic value is experienced is that it goes 
towards making intrinsic value more relevant to a broader public. Pragmatists have for a long 
time critiqued the superfluity of intrinsic value in environmental policy when, in order to protect 
the environment, the focus could remain on extrinsic, instrumental value. As Andrew Light 
argues, “the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of [intrinsic] value theory has pushed 
environmental ethics away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to 
embrace more supportive environmental views” (Light, 427). So according to Light, not only is 
intrinsic value more than we need, but it is also damaging because it does not mobilize the public 
to protect the environment. 
 However, if philosophers can accept that care and experiences of intrinsic value are 
linked, philosophy can relate to a public that already has the emotional capacity to care about the 
environment. It is here that McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value becomes, if you will, 
instrumentally valuable. Not everyone will be well-versed in the intricacies of intrinsic value 
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theory, but everyone will be familiar with love or awe or any of a number of other valuing 
attitudes, and thus everyone will have experienced intrinsic value. Though it manifests in 
different ways - as McShane writes, she would not love or take care of her daughter and the 
Mona Lisa in the same way - it gives philosophers a common ground because an experience of 
intrinsic value is its root cause (McShane, 56). This seems to be what Light suggests as a focus 
“on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions that most people carry 
around with them on an everyday basis” (Light, 444). In other words, we make arguments that 
match most people’s experiences of value. 
 McShane argues for a plurality of valuing attitudes, which are familiar to us. Besides 
love, she argues for awe, reverence, and respect, and does not claim her list is exhaustive. This 
range of very different valuing attitudes gives us the opportunity to see intrinsic value through a 
wide variety of experiences and allows for other experiences to show us intrinsic value as well.  
All the valuing attitudes that McShane names - love, awe, respect, and reverence - have 
the effect of decentering the observer from their self-occupied state. For example, when one 
arrives at the Grand Canyon, it’s a common experience to be completely awe-stricken. In that 
moment of looking out at something so grandiose, no one who is truly awe-stricken is thinking 
about getting to the hotel room. No one is thinking about the gift shop. Instead, they are 
completely occupied with the thing in front of them. They are valuing it directly just as it is. In a 
sense, this is the essence of intrinsic value; the needs and concerns of the observer are not 
relevant to the valuing. The experience of wildness, as I will argue below, is often the less 
glamorous way to experience something; it is the unexpected vertigo that comes after looking 
over the edge. 
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In this chapter I have argued that intrinsic value, as a way to approach how we experience 
and care about the world we live in, is still a relevant and important part of philosophy as well as 
something we already do. Using McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value, I argued that it is 
consistent with feminist care ethics because it acknowledges the role our emotions and reactions 
have in determining what we value. It is also consistent with pragmatism because under 
McShane’s configuration of intrinsic value, it becomes something that responds to our everyday 
ways of approaching ethical problems instead of some abstract notion. 
I argued that what all of McShane’s valuing attitudes have in common is a decentering of 
the observer. When something is being intrinsically valued, it is being valued for its own sake, 
independent of the needs or desires of the person experiencing it. Experiences of wildness are 
like McShane’s other valuing attitudes insofar as there is a similar decentering of the human 
observer. Yet experiences of wildness do this both more unexpectedly and in more diverse 
situations, including the ones we hate to have to face. I will discuss what an experience of 
wildness is like and some of the barriers to our experience of wildness in our day to day lives. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that intrinsic value, as understood as an experience we have and 
continue to have, remains relevant to environmental philosophy and our lives. This chapter is 
about wildness as an experience that we have restricted to certain places. 
 In this chapter, I first argue that experiences of wildness do not just occur in certain 
places, but can happen anywhere. Then I will discuss how philosophers of wildness often 
conflate experiences of wildness with wildness itself. In other words, they experience wildness in 
10 
 
the places they expect to find wildness. There is a preconceived notion about where wildness 
resides, and so any experience that happens outside of this place is already marked as not wild. 
Wildness, I claim, is an always present, consistent, underlying possibility and experiences of 
wildness depend on the observer’s ability to perceive it. The focus on protecting wildness instead 
of cultivating our ability to experience wildness reaffirms this conflation. 
I will argue that our ability to experience wildness is hindered by dualisms built into our 
way of thinking about what wildness is and specifically where we find it. One of the dualisms 
which western philosophy has, until very recently, taken for granted is the dualism between 
nature and culture. I will use Steven Vogel to discuss the relatively recent discussion of the 
social construction of nature. Nature, often considered pristine and distinct and far away from 
culture, is where wildness is considered to reside. Culture, within the bounds of a city, is orderly 
and ruled. Vogel argues against this understanding of nature and culture on the grounds that in 
reality we have so altered our environment that we can no longer distinguish between those parts 
that are affected by humans and those parts that are not. 
Analogously, we make distinctions between self and non-self which keep us from 
experiencing our lives as wild. Even if we concede a degree of unpredictability within culture, 
we rarely consider our own bodies and minds as being outside of our own understanding and 
control. Similarly, we assume that we can exercise control over things that are not ourselves. 
However, as I will argue, both the boundaries between culture and nature and self and non-self 
are permeable and not as strict as we might want to believe. 
I argue that while at times, making strong distinctions between nature and culture and self 
and non-self might be reasonable, these distinctions are not helpful in understanding and 
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experiencing wildness as pervasive. Rather, the boundaries keep us from realizing we are 
experiencing wildness. 
 Experiences of wildness are, by my definition, experiences where the world exceeds our 
expectations of it, temporarily disrupting any semblance of normalcy. Often this is surprising and 
shocking. If this definition of experiences of wildness seems general, it is because, as I will 
argue, experiences of wildness can happen anywhere. We typically consider experiences of 
wildness as happening only in a narrow range of places. Though the etymological roots of 
wildness may be tangled and wild themselves, they do not refer specifically to place. One 
meaning is to will, specifically self-will (Snyder, 11). The surprise of wildness happens when 
something ‘self-wills’ in a way that we were not expecting. 
 Consider the following situations. You are riding your bike downtown. In the split second 
where you look over your shoulder to see if a car is coming, you lose control of the bike and 
your face careens towards the pavement. This situation is not what the bike or the pavement were 
meant to do. Yet in this abnormal moment, you are forced to reckon with a world that you are 
not anticipating. Or perhaps you’re going for a hike, and you trip on a root on the trail and again 
your face goes careening towards a rocky surface. This also isn’t the purpose of the root or the 
trail. But this wildness leaps out at you and literally pulls you down to experience it. While I 
don’t argue that inanimate things are actually consciously self-willing, it is clear from these 
situations that the person involved is not successfully self-willing. 
Though we tend to expect experiences of wildness walking through a forest or some other 
natural area, perhaps the most shocking experiences of wildness happen in the places that we 
consider and expect to be most tame. I have hiked many miles without having an experience with 
wildlife as wild as the several times I was bit by an unleashed dog running through the park 
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while the shocked owner looked on. Wildness is hardly something that is restricted to the quiet 
corners of wilderness. 
 Steven Vogel, a philosopher that argues that wildness is not restricted to nature, and that 
nature does not even exist, writes in his book Thinking Like a Mall specifically about the 
wildness of artifacts and the processes that create them. Vogel argues that the entire world, 
insofar as it has been so deeply affected by the actions of humans, is constructed and artifactual 
at this point. By that estimation, everything that exists is an artifact (Vogel, 96-97). Important for 
my purposes, Vogel says that this doesn’t exclude anything from being wild. On the contrary, 
Vogel argues that everything is wild because there’s always a gap between what we expect from 
something and what actually comes to be.  
 In an experience of wildness, the person expecting something is overtaken by what 
actually is. This is not to say that Vogel’s gap disappears, but is acknowledged; we are no longer 
able to presume complete control once we have seen it. In that moment, our focus has completely 
gone away from a preoccupation with the self. The focus shifts outward and has moved to 
consider the thing we are having a wild experience with. These experiences of wildness, just like 
experiences of intrinsic value, have an element of decentering to them. Though usually we 
always see ourselves as the central point of our experiences - the one doing the experiencing - in 
our moments of total preoccupation with something else, that central point disappears. When that 
dog bit me as I was running through the park, I was no longer occupying myself with thoughts 
about doing laundry or paying bills. I came into a direct experience (in this case a confrontation) 
which I was unable to ignore. Yet too often, we refuse to see these as experiences of wildness. 
We draw lines to dictate what can be wild and what cannot. 
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Cities are one example of how we define and draw these boundaries. Cities are 
traditionally governed by laws, filled with law-abiding citizens, exclude most non-humans unless 
they are useful or unavoidable. The buses and businesses run on a particular schedule. Almost 
everyone has a job or designated place to be. The unpredictable things that happen in cities, such 
as muggings and people sleeping on park benches, are considered deviations from the norm. The 
city is an orderly place. 
In writing about the conflict between the city and the wild, philosopher Martin Drenthen 
talks about his home country of the Netherlands, and the threat to control that migrating wolves 
pose: “The Netherlands is known as a country with one of the best organized and most well-
ordered spatial planning in the world. Accordingly, each newly arrived species is also being met 
with planning, contingency plans, stakeholder meetings and legislation. Some believe that the 
Dutch reaction to the possible arrival of the wolf shows that the Dutch simply have lost the 
ability to tolerate disorderly things” (Drenthen, 329-30). The wolf here is one among many 
potential symbols that represent a threat to control and order. The infiltration of the city by 
something that symbolizes unusual wildness is met with the desire to control. 
 This understanding of the city, taken to its logical extremes, is the stuff of dystopian 
novels. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We illustrates the perfect city built within the confines of a wall. 
Citizens have jobs, strict timetables (according to the narrator, D-503, when the city is finally 
perfect even the two hours of leisure time in the day will be occupied with something 
productive), and privacy only if it is given with the permission of the authorities. Smoking or 
drinking is an offense punishable by death. Development of a soul, conscience, or imagination is 
considered a disease as it makes citizens restless and unruly. 
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 On the other side of their wall is “wild jungle.” D-503’s lover, I-330, not coincidentally 
shortened to “I” as opposed to “We”, breaks a hole in the wall allowing an unexpected flood of 
animals and greenery into the perfectly sterile city (Zamyatin, 203). Similar intrusions of 
wildness are also present in the later works 1984 by George Orwell and Brave New World by 
Aldous Huxley. The novels should illustrate that in our imaginations, wildness is entangled with 
a kind of unrestrained freedom that means more than any legal freedoms of the city.  
Since the beginning of human settlements, wildness has been cast out of the city in the 
minds of its inhabitants as dangerous and chaotic. But in the overwhelmingly ordered cities of 
these dystopian works the infiltration of wildness offers hope and highlights the problems of 
control and lack of genuine freedom within the state. They also show that all these dystopian 
thinkers conceive of wildness as something inextinguishable. Even though in all three novels the 
primary stimulus of rebellion is from outside the main character, it strikes a chord within him 
that resonates with latent doubts and inclinations toward freedom. 
But this wildness does not need to be experienced as coming from the world outside of 
the city. Steven Vogel believes we live in a wild world both in and out of the city. It is wild 
because, regardless of which parts we intentionally created and which parts we did not, we have 
thoroughly affected the world and despite this, it continues to exceed our expectations for it. 
Vogel argues that it is the world itself that is actually, at least in part, materially constructed by 
humans, but this doesn’t prohibit it from being wild (Vogel, 34-36). 
This also has effects on our ideas of the proper way to act in civilization. If we believe in 
a nature that only exists in places far away from us, and that we have a duty to protect and secure 
it at all costs, Vogel argues that we “have nothing to say about what happens on this side of the 
boundary (which is where by definition we actually live), leaving us curiously free to engage in 
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any environmental depredations we wish to undertake here. [original emphasis]” (Vogel, 13) To 
truly understand our causal responsibility for our world, we have to consider it all on equal 
ground. Protecting wildness as a component of nature out there and far away will not help us get 
to the roots of our environmental problems. Unlike some of the writers below, Vogel doesn’t 
write about wildness as if it’s a metaphysical quality. For Vogel, wildness is a material fact, 
meaning that forces in the world (such as gravity, time, etc.) work on things regardless of human 
beings, and for him this is wildness. However, all of the thinkers below share with Vogel an 
understanding of wildness as eluding human control and anticipation. 
Tom Birch, in defending wildness against the control of the state, calls into question the 
efforts of American preservationists to set aside wilderness areas. He writes that this is an effort 
by the imperium to bring wildness under the realm of human control. Even though the wilderness 
areas are not governed by the same laws as the city, he describes them as an attempt to “bring 
law to the wildness” (Birch 1990, 7). “Self-determination is not permitted for nature” in these 
wilderness areas, which Birch sees as prisons (Birch 1990, 5). Still, Birch claims that it would be 
a mistake to take wildness’ manifestations for wildness itself, even if means we lose sight of 
wildness when these manifestations are destroyed, wildness persists somewhere (Birch 1990, 9). 
Birch writes that a body of power needs to maintain wildness as something to control to 
reify the necessity of the regulating body and the danger to the imperium if this is not 
accomplished: “When we see the real otherness that is there beneath the imperium’s version of it, 
beneath all the usual categories of use and value, then we see an otherness that can never be fully 
described, understood or appropriated, and the entire edifice of the imperium is called into 
question…” (Birch 1990, 20). However if wildness cannot be contained, it is also present within 
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the imperium and can, as Birch describes in a later work discussed in chapter three, penetrate our 
experiences of wildness in the imperium. 
If we are in fact all under the imperium, humans and wilderness areas alike, where does 
wildness hide when we lose sight of it? Even though manifestations of wildness can be 
exterminated, Birch says, “wildness, which contradicts any finalization in identification, is… at 
the heart of any living self or society [original emphasis]” (Birch 1990, 11). It’s hard to know 
what “living” means for Birch. If the efforts of the imperium to capture wildness are ultimately 
deceptive and illusory, it’s not actually that the capturing is harmful to wildness. If wildness is 
truly inextirpable, there’s little reason for Birch to pay any mind to the imperium’s desire to 
capture and rule it. What Birch really fears in the imperium is how it hinders our ability to 
experience wildness, not its hobbling of wildness itself. Yet he focuses only on the imperium’s 
attempts to contain wildness rather than any attempts it might make to keep us from experiencing 
it. 
These fears are echoed and reaffirmed in the work of Jack Turner. In “The Abstract Wild: 
A Rant” Turner conflates wilderness and wildness, assuming that the loss of the former means 
the loss of the latter. He writes, “unless we can radically transform modern civilization, the 
wilderness and its people will be but a memory in the minds of a few people. When they die, it 
will die with them, and the wild will become completely abstract” (Turner, 32). It seems that 
Turner makes the category mistake that Birch warns of. He assumes that if we can truly 
extinguish the wild nature of any of wildness’ manifestations, that is if we don’t experience it in 
them, it means the extinguishing of wildness itself. 
Turner is responding not only to a loss of wildness, but to a claim that wildness can be 
captured and visited whenever someone desires. This alleged capture of wildness deceives us 
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into thinking we need not worry about protecting the environment. Wildness is in a pen at the 
zoo, over there. Turner speculates that what we are trying to save, and what we have failed 
miserably in saving, is a sense of our home as wild (Turner, 35). Turner hopes for a radical 
transformation of modern civilization that will keep wildness from becoming abstract. Yet, 
contra Turner, wildness so eludes control that we really needn’t fear its disappearance. Wildness 
could only become abstract if we totally and irreversibly fail to experience it. In both their 
defenses of wildness, Birch and Turner presuppose that the conflict is between an abstract 
civilization and wildness, rather than focusing on some inner conflict within the people who live 
there which keeps them from the experience. 
Writer Jay Griffiths, author of Wild: An Elemental Journey, travels the world looking for 
wildness as she assumes it persists primarily in indigenous cultures. The only part of her story 
that takes place in her native United Kingdom is when she makes arrangements to get out of it. 
She writes of the cities she visits (merely as stopovers to the next wild place) as dirty and 
grotesque and bemoans the effects they have had on indigenous culture. Though this critique is 
fair, she refuses (to experience) any genuine wildness in the city. Griffiths writes, “We are 
animal in our blood and in our skin. We were not born for pavements and escalators but for 
thunder and mud. More. We are animal not only in body but in spirit” (Griffiths, 84). 
Yet we are social animals, and in our numbers it is not surprising we have taken to living 
in these large, complex collectives. She does describe a few symptoms of wildness in human 
culture (meaning outside of the indigenous communities she visits): “It is the first ‘fuck’ on 
television, it simmers in the feral intoxication of jazz, it explodes exuberant in carnival…” 
(Griffiths, 85). These experiences read as momentary intrusions of wildness, rather than a 
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persistent existence of it. In her glorification of wildness in the indigenous settlements she visits, 
Griffiths disparages the lives most of us live. 
But I think there’s an alternative to this divisive notion that wildness only exists in 
wilderness or so-called natural areas. We can revel in wildness when we go for a morning walk 
through the city and something surprises us; we should also be glad when we have luxury to sit 
down on a bench or drink at a water fountain. Perhaps in the past it has been necessary to shun 
culture to show the importance of wilderness. However, the thinkers above have overcorrected 
and their love of wildness is assumed to be mutually exclusive with any love of culture. 
There is inconsistency in these philosophers of the wild. They critique humans for 
destroying wildness with their culture, yet they describe wildness as something resilient that, 
despite the tremendous human impact on the environment, continues to survive. They critique 
human society for its lack of wildness yet provide no suggestions for its improvement. To answer 
both claims, I suggest that rather than keeping our focus outward on vast landscapes that we 
consider the last vestiges of the wild, we look inward and really examine how we can learn to 
experience ourselves and the world as wild. 
Seemingly agreeing with other wildness philosophers, Gary Snyder writes, “‘the 
world’, with the exception of a tiny bit of human intervention, is ultimately a wild place,” 
implying that the places where there is human intervention are antithetical to wildness. 
He adds, “we can say that New York City and Tokyo are ‘natural’ but not ‘wild.’ They do 
not deviate from the laws of nature, but they are habitat so exclusive in the matter of who 
and what they give shelter to, and so intolerant of other creatures, as to be truly odd” 
(Snyder, 12). 
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 Yet later, he softens this by saying, “civilization is permeable, and could be 
inhabited as the wild is.” Echoing Birch, he remarks on the inexorability of wildness, 
“Wilderness may temporarily dwindle, but wildness won’t go away” (Snyder, 16). It 
seems Snyder’s view of a full, robust wildness is to some degree truncated at the city line 
too. However, he writes that humans are more wild than they think. He writes that “to 
resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild, we must first resolve to be whole” 
(Snyder, 24). The mere possibility of this resolution distinguishes Snyder from other 
defenders of wildness. 
Despite his misgivings about civilization, Snyder states that we are always wild 
more clearly than others have:  
 
Our bodies are wild. The involuntary quick turn of the head at a shout, the vertigo at 
looking off a precipice, the heart-in-the-throat in a moment of danger, the catch of the 
breath, the quiet moments relaxing, staring, reflecting - all universal responses of this 
mammal body… The world is our consciousness and it surrounds us. There are more 
things in mind, in the imagination, than ‘you’ can keep track of - thoughts, memories, 
images, angers, delights, rise unbidden. The depths of mind, the unconscious, are our 
inner wilderness areas, and that is where a bobcat is right now (Snyder, 17). 
 
This claim differs from most of western philosophy. It states that not only is the outside 
world wild, but we ourselves are wild in both our bodies and minds. To resolve to be 
whole is to accept wildness as something familiar, literally in the family. It is something 
that does not exist exclusively outside the city.  
There are practical, useful physical barriers which we maintain between ourselves 
and the stuff outside of us, whether those barriers are city limits or the bodies that need to 
be distinguished between other bodies to keep them from running into each other. Yet we 
would be mistaken if we consider those boundaries impermeable, immutable, and solid. 
The person who disagrees with this will have to reckon with the trillions of bacteria 
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inhabiting them. In a very real sense, our bodies do not belong only to us. Our minds, too, 
are like this and, as Snyder suggests, not completely within our control or understanding. 
Wildness can never be extinguished because our own wildness within us is so deep that it 
can never even be fathomed. 
 Even in seemingly tame, non-wild entities, there is wildness and capability to 
experience it. Snyder defines this as “perennially within us, dormant as a hard-shelled 
seed, awaiting the fire or flood that wakes it again” (Snyder, 14). The wildness is there, 
but we lack the eyes to see it. Snyder’s book Practice of the Wild is about exactly that - a 
practice that encourages the latent ability in us to see wildness to take root and grow, 
transforming the world around us. 
What I have hoped to show in the preceding pages is that because of our inability 
to experience wildness in the world and in ourselves, because we view it as something 
that exists in some far away place, person, or other entity, we are not able to understand 
wildness as a possible quality of all our experiences.  
I argued that past defenders of wildness have made arguments and expressed fears 
that only reaffirm these dualisms between nature and culture that Steven Vogel is arguing 
against by trying to protect a wildness that exists in nature that has been killed in 
civilization. They have assumed that wildness resides outside of city limits because they 
conflate wildness with experiences of wildness. Defenders of wildness, despite good 
intentions, are still operating within this paradigm. Similarly, the dualism between self 
and non-self tends to reify an understanding of the self as a known, controlled entity, like 
a city, cordoned off from the rest of the world. 
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 Ultimately, the pursuit of protecting wildness is wrongheaded because wildness is 
so inalienable and uncontrollable that we never have to worry about it disappearing. This 
is not to say that the places we consider wild are not worth preserving. Wilderness areas 
are still worth protecting. They too are wild and can train our experience of wildness. But 
to appreciate wilderness areas only for a wildness that we can find nowhere else is a 
mistake on our part. As humans trying to connect to and learn to care for an increasingly 
troubled world, experiencing wildness offers us an opportunity to confront the things in 
life that are not us yet nonetheless demand our attention. 
 In the next section, I will discuss how we might learn to be more open to 
experiences of intrinsic value and wildness in our day to day lives. The nature of wildness 
is such that we can never anticipate when these experiences will strike. I will argue for 
and discuss the potential for consciously opening ourselves up to similar experiences. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Experiences of intrinsic value and wildness will always be a possibility in our lives. They come 
to us unexpectedly and force us to reckon with something that we did not happen to notice 
before. There will always be the opportunity for wild experiences, because we will always find 
ourselves in situations we weren’t paying attention to before. Startling, heart-stopping, 
adrenaline-fueled experiences of wildness demand our attention. But in this section, I will argue 
for the ways this attention can and should be freely given.  
 I start by returning to Birch, who should not be thrown out with the bathwater. 
Specifically, I review Birch’s understanding of moral consideration. Birch believes that the 
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pursuit of an adequate criteria for moral consideration has been a pursuit of western domination, 
much like the goal of restricting wildness to wilderness areas. He offers instead the idea of 
universal moral considerability, which is to say paying attention to all things actively before we 
undertake any activities which would affect them. He offers the term “deontic experience” to 
describe an encounter with something which leaves us with the feeling of what we must do. 
 Birch is far from giving us concrete guidelines for understanding exactly how to become 
considerate of things in our daily lives. I expand on Birch’s philosophy by following his implicit 
and explicit references to Zen Buddhism. I view Zen through the lens of Gary Snyder, whose life 
and work have been immensely influenced by practicing Zen. I argue that he can provide a 
clearer understanding of what it means to undertake and fully commit to Birch’s deontic 
experience in everyday life. 
 I offer this practice of Zen as a way for us to live a life full of caring attention. Instead of 
the usual ethical propensity for constantly expanding on which beings we give moral 
consideration to, the approach of Birch and Zen is to start from the consideration of all things 
and consistently move inward towards those beings which we have ethical responsibilities to. 
 I will conclude this chapter by returning to Katie McShane and intrinsic value. I will 
argue that universal moral consideration is a way of understanding how best to care for the world 
around us. I argue that this care is the same care that Katie McShane talks about. By virtue of the 
fact that the world is able to call to us to take some action towards it is a sufficient condition for 
us to care for and experience it as intrinsically valuable. Though experiencing intrinsic value 
does not necessarily have anything to say about our ethical obligations to beings and things in the 
world, it is a reason to at least regard them carefully. 
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Tom Birch’s article “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration” is the sequel to 
“The Incarceration of Wildness” appearing three years later. It illustrates an optimism not seen in 
“The Incarceration of Wildness.” While it still focuses on the imperium’s attempt to corral and 
categorize the unfamiliar, it also offers a hopeful alternative in the form of universal 
consideration, which entails giving all things, including the non-sentient and inanimate, at the 
very least a basic consideration before acting in a way that would affect them. 
 Birch begins by critiquing the standard formulation of moral consideration, quoting 
Kenneth Goodpaster: “For all A, X deserves moral consideration from A.[..when X meets 
specific, preordained necessary and sufficient conditions.]” (qtd. in Birch 1993, 314). He writes 
that this formulation shows the inherent imperialism of the western philosophical project of 
designating moral value. It does this by virtue of the fact that the people assessing the moral 
value of something come up with the necessary and sufficient criteria before encountering the 
specific candidate for moral value thus effectively shutting off the possibility for some things 
before they’re even encountered. The project presupposes that the criteria for moral 
considerability are right. Birch’s goal in his essay is not to develop a new criteria, but to 
completely deconstruct the question of moral considerability itself (Birch 1993, 314). 
 He regards the question as completely nestled in a context of western thought, which 
denies moral regard to some beings for a variety of arbitrary reasons, for example sentience or 
rationality. This particular way of viewing the nonhuman world is not, Birch argues, necessarily 
the standard. He writes: 
Certainly in many cultures moral considerability has been afforded to nonhuman beings of various 
sorts, and even in our own culture there are many people who do give consideration to 
nonhumans, such as wild animals, trees, mountains, wilderness, and farmland. Of course, their 
voices are generally marginalized. This essay may be viewed as an attempt to give voice to this 
marginalized sensibility in a way that mandates its being heard (Birch 1993, 317). 
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Not only is the predominant understanding of moral considerability culturally contextual; it is 
also historically contextual, as the range of beings and things considered worthy of moral 
consideration has continued to shift and expand. Where once we might have only (or at least 
most highly) morally considered rich, white men, we then began allowing poor, white men, 
nonwhite peoples, and women, among others, though this struggle continues.2 And in some 
cases, we start making ethical room for the moral considerability of nonhuman animals and even 
entire ecosystems whether they include human beings or not. We seek finitude and completion; 
this pursuit thus far has proven to be wrongheaded. 
 Since, through the course of history, there have been so many beings up for 
reconsideration, Birch wonders why we even need to close the discussion about which beings (or 
even things) are morally considerable. The lesson we should learn from our history is that our 
comfortable self-assurances about which beings we consider objectively morally considerable 
are subject to change and not objective whatsoever. They keep developing as we are forced to 
reconsider other beings and things. 
 The crux of Birch’s argument is that before we can ever even evaluate our moral 
obligations to another being, we must consider the being. This encounter comes first and 
foremost regardless of what ethical obligations we have formed because of them. Birch writes, 
“the most fundamental job of the entire business of ethical research is the discovery of our 
obligations. Nevertheless, it is not possible to discover our obligations to others, of whatever 
sort, unless and until we give them moral consideration” (Birch 1993, 322). Consideration is a 
necessary step before we can even evaluate our obligations. 
                                                 
2
 Birch writes, “wise and enlightened people already treat other people as human beings until it is proved otherwise - 
there is no a priori requirement for another person to prove his or her worth. Universal consideration requires the 
extension of the same attitude toward the nonhuman world.” pp. 328 - 329. 
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 Birch introduces the term deontic experience to define experiences where a person is 
drawn to someone or something, filling the person with the urge that they must do something. 
Birch writes that this experience, which is the point of origin in our experience of ethical 
obligations, is what inspires us to act according to our ethical beliefs. While the deontic 
experience could be strong, it does not necessarily determine our obligations towards something. 
Deontic experience is rooted in intuition and feeling, not just logic. This can be misleading and 
requires further philosophical inquiry, but is a necessary starting point. We can have deontic 
experiences without ethical obligations, but we cannot, Birch argues, have ethical obligations 
without our prior deontic experiences. 
 Birch describes these experiences as “generated out of a relationship with any kind of 
entity: persons, things, systems, ecosystems, other sorts of abstractions, even numbers” (Birch 
1993, 323). And while it doesn’t imply that we necessarily have ethical obligations to any of 
these things, it does imply that we can have a relationship of some kind with all of the above 
things. These are relationships which may very well create ethical obligations where we may not 
have seen them before. They are what we turn to when “we are pressed to explain and justify, 
and prove to others, our ethical judgments and practices. We turn to them in the course of our 
own deliberations, to test and prove practical ethical hypotheses” (Birch 1993, 323). These very 
intuitive interactions and reactions to the world around us are the fundamental way we shape our 
future interactions with it. 
 Birch says that we usually do not grasp the implications of deontic experiences 
immediately and that they might take years to develop more fully. The experience is sudden, but 
what it means for the development of our ethics is unclear at first. At the moment of the deontic 
experience, however, we usually “know at some level that something has happened that will 
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have to be reckoned with sooner or later” (Birch 1993, 324). Ethics, as our way of thinking 
through the implications of our behavior, is that reckoning. 
Birch advocates a refining of our capacity to consciously recognize deontic experiences 
as they happen. He writes, somewhat mystically, “Whetted to the point of the ideal, which we 
might call the point of perfect virtue - a flawless spontaneity - the practice of giving 
consideration would be the continuous realization of the epiphany of every moment” (Birch 
1993, 324). He invokes Thoreau’s practice of walking and Zen’s practice of mindfulness as 
manifestations of this practice. Taken with those practices, what Birch means is far from 
mystical; he means only that in a perfect world, we would consider beings actively and selflessly 
at all times. He writes that when such epiphanic moments come as a result of deontic experience, 
we realize “part of what it is to be a human being” (Birch 1993, 324). Specifically, we realize 
things as not just part of the human world, but also humans as part of the rest of the world. 
He states that if it were possible to cultivate this perfect practice that made consideration 
and attention central, we may be able to dispense with ethics. Ethics and how it tells us to 
consider other beings is, as Birch shows, an imperfect, constantly changing, historically and 
culturally contingent set of rules. Consideration and reconsideration always yields to these 
changes and therefore never falls into the problem that ethics does of moral backpedaling from 
strict, uncompromising ethical positions. Dispensing with ethics is, however, only possible 
“given a sufficiently honed practice of attentiveness to others, given the perfect virtue mentioned 
above, given the perhaps infallible spontaneity of enlightenment” (Birch 1993, 329). Again Birch 
seems to tread near to the mystical. However, his goal is not to abolish ethics as the perfection 
above remains elusive. His goal is to show that this attentiveness is at the root of any of our 
moral intuitions and if we persisted in such a state, we would be consistently considerate of and 
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attentive to other beings. He merely tries to point to the fact that ethics fails, time and again, as 
we begin to consider or reconsider beings that we didn’t before. 
Birch summons up, both explicitly and implicitly, Zen Buddhism through his discussion 
of mindfulness and enlightenment. This brings in an element of deontic experience that Birch 
doesn’t explicitly focus on, but is consistent with the rest of his discussion of attentiveness. This 
element is a lack of focus on the self, and it is an explicitly Buddhist notion that is required for 
both mindfulness (or Birch’s concentration and attentiveness) and subsequent enlightenment. 
The root of Birch’s problem is not the lack of attentiveness; we are always attentive to 
something. It is that we are often attentive to the self that we define by its rational thinking mind 
and its collection of thoughts and ethical beliefs that we consider constant and unchanging. The 
proper attention that Birch is advocating cannot be achieved by a merely intellectual 
understanding or encounter with something. It is an encounter that does not put the thing apart 
from the observer. 
Gary Snyder comments on this attachment to the thinking mind and its inability to let the 
rest of the world in. He quotes the Genjōkōan, a 12th century Zen Buddhist text by Zen master 
Dōgen Zenji. “‘We study the self to forget the self,’ said Dōgen. ‘When you forget the self, you 
become one with the ten thousand things.’ Ten thousand things means all of the phenomenal 
world. When we are open that world can occupy us. Yet we are still called on to wrestle with the 
curious phenomenon of the complex human self, needed but excessive, which resists letting the 
world in” (Snyder, 160). When we have Birch’s deontic experience or a wild experience,3 it is a 
                                                 
3
 Birch’s deontic experience is different from the wild experience insofar as wildness refers to a quality of the 
experience (that it is unexpected, etc) and deontic refers to the implications of the experience (that one must do 
something). They are far from mutually exclusive. The wildness of the experience hits immediately while its deontic 
implications usually take time to develop. 
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moment where the world has occupied us, subverting the immediate interests we have in 
ourselves. 
Our pigeonholing of which beings are morally considerable is closely linked to our 
pigeonholing of which places and things are wild. We presuppose the right criteria before we 
give something the opportunity to show itself to us. Snyder writes on this, and how best we 
should open ourselves to the world. “Mountaineers climb peaks for the great view, the 
cooperation and comradeship, the lively hardship - but mostly because it puts you out there 
where the unknown happens, where you encounter surprise [original emphasis].” This unknown, 
surprising encounter is, of course, an experience of wildness. We find mountains considerable 
because of, among other reasons, the wildness we easily experience there. Snyder continues, 
“The truly experienced person, the refined person, delights in the ordinary [original emphasis]” 
(Snyder, 164). By delimiting the bounds of what we can experience wildness in, we 
simultaneously do harm to ourselves and the rest of the world. To open the whole world up as 
something we can experience wildness in, and intrinsic value for that matter, means to be able to 
find those things in anything we encounter or are doing. 
The epiphanic moments Birch writes about when we reach this union with reality, where 
we are no longer keeping it at arm’s length but embracing it as part of our bodies and minds, is 
enlightenment. Snyder writes, “What we didn’t perhaps see so clearly was that self-realization, 
even enlightenment, is another aspect of our wildness - a bonding of the wild in ourselves to the 
(wild) process of the universe” (Snyder, xi). 
 This all may sound very nice, but difficult. One need not commit to any complicated 
metaphysics to undertake the practice of paying careful attention to the world. Birch was right to 
associate Thoreau’s practice of walking with the Zen practice of mindfulness. These ways of 
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experiencing reality are not limited to these varieties of the practice of attention. These are not 
metaphysical practices, but rather they are rooted in the physical world that is actually happening 
around the observer. Snyder writes that Zen is mostly practice; he says that much of the theory 
that one associates with Zen in particular and Buddhism in general is hazardous insofar as it 
leads people to rely on something other than their direct experience (Snyder, ix).  
This practice of mindfulness, which is freely giving our attention to things in our lives, 
allows direct experience of the world. This takes time to develop. One way to develop this is 
meditation. Meditation is central when beginning Zen practice. Sitting still, without much outside 
stimulation, allows us to more clearly observe our thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and sensations. 
These are things that separate the self from the world around it. The goal of mindfulness is not to 
stop seeing things in this way or to totally dismiss them, but to pay attention to the rest of the 
world as well. This is illustrated in a Zen story: 
 
Nan-in was visited by Tenno, who, having passed his apprenticeship, had become a teacher. The 
day happened to be rainy, so Tenno wore wooden clogs and carried an umbrella. After greeting 
him Nan-in remarked: “I suppose you left your wooden clogs in the vestibule. I want to know if 
your umbrella is on the right or left side of the clogs.” Tenno, confused, had no instant answer. He 
realized that he was unable to carry his Zen every minute (Reps and Senzaki, 52-53). 
 
 
In this story, even the experienced Zen practitioner’s mind was sufficiently occupied that 
he was not able to pay attention even to what he was doing himself. Privileging the thinking 
mind over the things we do in our day to day lives only continue to keep us separate from what 
Buddhists call the ten thousand things and the whole phenomenal universe (Snyder, 105). It 
certainly also shows a lack of universal consideration. 
But we don’t need to buy black robes and sit in full lotus posture all day chanting the 
heart sutra in a meditation hall in Japan for 12 years to experience mindfulness. We need to 
merely find ourselves capable of observing our reactions and realizing how we already move 
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through the world. As Birch said, Thoreau’s process of doing this was walking, a literal moving 
through the world. To encounter the world and even have the opportunity to consciously morally 
consider it, we have to be in it, with it, and open to it. Birch quotes Zen master Shunryu Suzuki, 
“Mindfulness is… wisdom. By wisdom we do not mean some particular faculty or philosophy. It 
is the readiness of the mind that is wisdom… Wisdom is something which will come out of your 
mindfulness. So the point is to be ready for observing things, and to be ready for thinking. This is 
called emptiness of your mind” (qtd. in Birch 1993, 324). It’s to come to something without the 
preconceived notions of what it’s good for and how it matters ethically. 
Universal consideration, whether as a practice derived from Zen or some other place, is 
the most basic amount of care we should give to the world we live in; it is, to use Katie 
McShane’s words, a claim “about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that 
thing” (McShane, 43). And we need to care about the world, because we are part and parcel with 
it. Birch writes, “the nonhuman, as well as the human, world is valued and is preserved, in part, 
because it does make deep consideration, mindfulness, and attentiveness possible and meaningful 
[original emphasis]” (Birch, 331). 
What Zen, universal consideration, experiences of wildness, and experiences of intrinsic 
value have in common is that they focus on experiencing the world carefully and just as it is, 
apart from the self and any of its concerns. Just as Snyder said Zen practice can often become the 
victim of too much theory, intrinsic value often does as well. If we understand intrinsic value not 
as some esoteric metaphysical property of the natural world but, as McShane does, as something 
that we do every day already, it can resolve many of its philosophical problems while also 
philosophically legitimating the way we already interact with the world. Experiences of wildness 
demand our attention whenever they happen. They bring things immediately, if temporarily, to 
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the forefront of our lives, shifting the focus from ourselves. These experiences of wildness are 
important and will always astound us with their unexpected suddenness. We can also give our 
consideration and attention to the world freely, whether it’s through Zen meditation, or walking, 
or any of the other practices that encourage this consideration. 
If we allow for the possibility of experiencing value through this careful attention, an 
inability to experience the value in something is no longer something lacking in that thing. The 
lack is in us. We can now reinterpret a quote mentioned in chapter one from Holmes Rolston, III: 
“Places that stimulate an experience of the sublime warrant particular care, as that experience is 
infrequent in rebuilt environments” (Rolston, 305). In light of what has been said here about 
experiences of wildness and intrinsic value, we can say that since the experience of wildness is 
infrequent in rebuilt environments, we should enact universal consideration and undertake 
practices that stimulate this experience. It is experience, not something independent of it, that 
causes an experience of intrinsic value and a basic level of care. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I have sought to show here is that the role of our human experience in specifically 
environmental ethics and philosophy in general has been underappreciated. What Katie 
McShane’s work has shown is that we experience intrinsic value only through the experiences 
that show us the value of something. What Tom Birch and McShane share is the idea that 
regardless of all of our ethical theories, before we think about the world we experience it directly 
and this experience informs everything else. This is invaluable to ethics because it means few, if 
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any, of our ways of valuing the world are unmediated. We can’t help but value the world through 
some experience. 
 For the most part, we decide how those experiences happen. For example, we’re unable 
to believe our world is wild. Because of our preconceived notions of where, when, and with what 
wildness happens we only experience it through the violent, demanding experiences described 
above. Experiences of wildness demand our attention only in situations where we weren’t 
already giving it freely.  
A world where we undertake practices that teach us how to give our attention freely have 
the opportunity to change our way of experiencing the world we live in. While as described these 
practices require a person’s experience, they are decentering in the sense that they do not give the 
person a superiority over the thing they are encountering. The person may make ethical decisions 
after the fact, but in the moment of that the experience happens, the person is considering 
something just as it is. 
We cannot just consider the world and the things in it when they are instrumentally 
valuable to us. Paying attention to all things, including the ones that are uncomfortable, 
inconvenient, or just undesirable, helps to make us more thoughtful citizens of the world, whose 
lives, as Birch noted, are made more meaningful by paying attention to the other things in it 
(Birch, 1993, 331). 
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